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This report analyses practices of differentiated treatment, whereby a platform applies 
dissimilar conditions to business users in equivalent situations, and explores the extent to 
which such practices constitute a potential source of “unfairness” in the relationship between 
platforms and businesses in the online platform economy. A distinction is made between 
practices of self-favouring, whereby a platform gives preferential treatment to its own 
vertically integrated activities over those of rivals, and more general practices of 
differentiated treatment where one or more business users are treated more favourably than 
one or more others.  
The report aims to provide guidance on how to assess the impact of differentiated treatment 
by online platforms from a technical, economic and legal perspective, and identifies areas 
requiring further scrutiny because of the especially problematic nature of certain practices 
implemented by platforms. Special scrutiny seems particularly needed for practices of 
differentiated treatment by vertically integrated platforms that are dominant or whose 
consumers single-home and have high switching costs. In these circumstances, the relevant 
harms can outweigh the efficiencies of differentiated treatment. Another area of attention is 
differentiated treatment that significantly harms business users and for which the platform 
does not have a legitimate justification. The extent to which legitimate reasons invoked by a 
platform can justify harm to businesses is a key issue for future consideration. Significant 
harm to business users may translate into consumer detriment through less choice and 
diversity of offerings. 
Specific future prohibitions of certain problematic practices of differentiated treatment to 
promote diversity, fairness or equality of opportunities for businesses should be coupled with 
effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Two areas are of particular concern: 1) 
the observability of differentiated treatment by platforms arising from techniques such as 
personalisation and localisation; (2) the availability of effective redress for businesses against 





The relationship of businesses vis-à-vis online platforms (i.e. internet-based services that 
bring different customer groups together) has recently come under increased scrutiny, both 
from a regulatory as well as from a competition law perspective. Differentiated treatment is 
a common feature across markets and is not inherently problematic. Hence, a key issue in 
these investigations, which focus on the online platform economy, is under what conditions 
‘differentiated treatment’ by platforms of business users is to be regarded as problematic. 
The most prominent example is the decision of the European Commission in June 2017 to fine 
Google for abusing its dominance in the market for online search by systematically giving 
prominent placement to its own comparison shopping service. To end the infringement, the 
Commission required Google to treat ‘competing comparison shopping services no less 
favourably than its own comparison shopping service’, in particular by applying ‘the same 
processes and methods to position and display’ comparison shopping services in its general 
search results.1 Following this Google Shopping decision, various national competition 
authorities have started investigations into differentiated treatment by a number of online 
platforms, including Apple, Allegro and emag.2 In November 2020, the European Commission 
sent a statement of objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data 
to the benefit of its own retail business and opened a second competition investigation into 
possible preferential treatment of Amazon’s own retail offers and those of marketplace 
sellers that use Amazon’s logistics and delivery services..3  
Many of these cases illustrate the tensions arising from the possible dual role of the platform 
in (1) providing online intermediation or online search services for business users, and (2) 
selling its own products on that marketplace as well so that it competes with business users. 
As such, these platforms are vertically integrated and provide services to consumers in 
competition with businesses active on their platform. Depending on its size and importance, 
this dual role can give the platform a superior bargaining position in relation to its business 
users. This may result in situations where an imbalance occurs between the interests of the 
platform and businesses, potentially leading to the imposition of unfair practices on business 
users. The favouring of own products or services by online platforms was also identified as 
                                                          
1 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), 27 June 2017, par. 699-700. 
2 See Press release Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, ‘ACM launches investigation into abuse 
of dominance by Apple in its App Store’, 11 April 2019, available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-
launches-investigation-abuse-dominance-apple-its-app-store; Press release Polish Competition Authority, 
‘Competition authority searches premises of Grupa Allegro’, 7 July 2017, available at 
https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=13332; Press release Romanian Competition Authority, ´The 
Competition Council analyses a possible abuse of dominant position of Dante International SA´, of 4 January 
2018, available at: 
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/bucket13/id13068/inspectii_dante_dec_2017_englis
h.pdf. 
3 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for 
the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business 




one of three most commonly experienced problematic trading practices by business 
respondents to the European Commission’s 2016 public consultation on platforms.4  
Any analysis of differentiated treatment has to consider cases that go beyond mere self-
favouring, as unfair differentiated treatment may also occur in situations where the platform 
does not directly compete with business users. Both of these scenarios are considered here. 
From a more factual perspective, differentiated treatment can take various shapes as the 
different ongoing competition investigations and various reports on competition in the digital 
era5 illustrate: from cases of self-favouring or otherwise unfair treatment in rankings to 
differentiation in terms of access to data. The power of companies in prioritising certain 
offerings in the online marketplace over others, also raises broader issues related to fairness, 
transparency and accountability towards business users and end-users, and the functioning 
of our democracies.6 While these are vital concerns, such broader considerations do not form 
the core of this report. 
Our focus is on an analysis of differentiated treatment as a potential source of ‘unfairness’ in 
the relationship between platforms and businesses in the online platform economy. While 
companies can also engage in differentiated treatment towards consumers in business-to-
consumer (B2C) relations, for instance in the form of personalised prices,7 the focus here is 
on the impact of differentiated treatment in business-to-businesses (B2B) or, more 
specifically, platform-to-business (P2B) relations. For the purposes of this report, 
‘differentiated treatment’ is defined as the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
situations (see also Article 102(c) TFEU). We distinguish between practices of self-favouring, 
whereby a platform gives preferential treatment to its own vertically integrated activities over 
those of rivals, and more general practices of differentiated treatment where one or more 
business users are treated more favourably than one or more others. As mentioned from the 
outset, differentiated treatment is present in many markets and is not problematic in itself. 
In the online platform economy, differentiation is inherent in rankings, whose exact function 
is to list content in an order of importance or relevance in view of the platform’s offering to 
end-users. Differences in the position of businesses vis-à-vis the platform may also sometimes 
make situations non-equivalent, so that there is no differentiated treatment in the first place. 
And there may be objective reasons or justifications for a platform to apply different 
conditions to businesses in similar situations. Such possible justifications notwithstanding, the 
potentially far-reaching consequences of differentiated treatment for business users raise 
significant issues with respect to the functioning of markets that require further analysis. 
                                                          
4 Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy. 
5 See DG Competition report ‘Competition policy for the digital era’, April 2019; Report of the Digital 
Competition Expert Panel ‘Unlocking digital competition’, March 2019; Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission report ‘Digital Platforms Inquiry’, June 2019. 
6 For a discussion of end-user interests and relevant legal frameworks, see section 6.2. 
7 See Consumer market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the 





In light of these concerns, this report aims to provide guidance on how to assess the impact 
of differentiated treatment by online platforms from a technical, economic and legal 
perspective, and identifies areas requiring further scrutiny because of the especially 
problematic nature of certain practices implemented by platforms. As instances of 
differentiated treatment are not necessarily limited to cases where a platform holds a 
‘dominant position’ within the meaning of EU competition law,8 the report looks beyond the 
application and interpretation of competition rules.  
2 Analogies with other sectors 
The issue of differentiated treatment by entities holding a position of power in particular 
value chains is by no means a new phenomenon. For assessing the impact of differentiated 
treatment in the online platform setting, we briefly take stock of the best-known analogies 
with other sectors: differentiated treatment in a brick-and-mortar setting (supermarkets) and 
the notion of net neutrality as enforced in the context of electronic communications services. 
This section explores the extent to which such analogies can provide useful insight for our 
analysis.   
 
2.1 Analogy with differentiated treatment in a brick-and-mortar context 
Practices of differentiated treatment that are observed in the online platform economy have 
a similarity with offline commercial behaviour, for instance in the context of supermarkets. 
The ranking that an online platform displays to users can be compared to the way a 
supermarket displays products to shoppers as they walk along the shelves in the store.  
Like a vertically integrated platform may have incentives to put its own products higher up in 
the ranking, a supermarket will want to use its power over the placement of products in its 
bargaining with suppliers, while products of its own brand get the spot on the shelves that 
generates the highest profits. One can draw an analogy with how some online platforms offer 
business users the option of getting a more favourable placement in the ranking by paying 
commissions, engaging in special deals or taking ancillary services. This type of paid 
prominence is indeed similar to ‘slotting allowances’ in supermarkets, referring to a lump-
sum up-front payment that a supplier must pay to a supermarket for having its products 
placed on the shelves. Slotting allowances have generated the competition concern that 
strong retailers demand large up-front payments that small suppliers cannot afford to pay.9 
At the same time, slotting allowances have the benefit of helping newcomers to attain 
visibility more quickly. If such analogy with online platforms works, depends on whether 
supermarkets can be compared with online platforms that act as intermediaries between 
                                                          
8 In United Brands, the Court of Justice defined ‘dominance’ as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers’ (Case 27/76 United Brands, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, par. 65). 
9 W.K. Tom, ‘Slotting Allowances and the Antitrust Laws: Testimony of the Federal Trade Commission before 
the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives’, Washington D.C., 20 October 1999. 
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businesses and consumers, considering the various angles relating to their business model 
and economic features.  
One such obvious angle is scale and the possibility of expanding it. Platforms offer 
unprecedented scale (in the online world, even a specialised platform can have sellers in the 
order of millions10), and have virtually unlimited shelf space. Moreover, expansion is not 
constrained by costly investments as in the case of supermarkets, as platforms do not need 
to invest in the production of the content, goods or services or other forms of capital they 
give access to. Supermarkets need to change their physical layouts in shops, warehouses, and 
physical supply chains, whereas digital intermediaries benefit from so-called “scale-without-
mass”. 
Another angle relates to the nature of the markets operated by platforms versus 
supermarkets. Platforms are multi-sided markets and intermediate direct transactions 
between business users and consumers.  They offer a unique form of intermediation and 
create entirely new markets (apps for instance would not exist without app stores).  Although 
there is a discussion in economic literature about the extent to which supermarkets can be 
modeled as two-sided platforms,11 supermarkets are usually characterised as one-sided 
resellers. This is a relevant difference considering that it locates part of the risk and the ability 
to set prices with the supermarket (depending on the circumstances, such as whether the 
supermarket can return unsold items to the supplier), rather than with the suppliers as is the 
case in the online platform setting.   
A question is whether more systematic monitoring or a stricter attitude should be taken 
towards forms of differentiated treatment on online platforms as compared to offline 
equivalents, because of the scale of the practices and affected businesses or the increasing 
market concentration and dependence on platforms. For instance, the practices of online 
platforms are more opaque due to personalisation of rankings in accordance with the profile 
of the user, while the shelves in a supermarket are arranged in the same way for all shoppers. 
The effects of paid-for placement in supermarkets are therefore more easily verifiable for 
suppliers who can visit the shop and check for themselves how the shelves are organised. At 
the same time, the increased use of data on customer preferences and behaviour and the 
integration of such data into supermarkets’ business practices, including through 
personalised shopping experiences, does create additional information asymmetries 
between suppliers and supermarkets.12 
Similar to the position of supermarkets, online platforms have a large sets of data on the 
transactions facilitated on their marketplace. However, at least two factors would seem to 
differentiate the amount and depth of data that the two can gather: a) the number of 
                                                          
10 Some of the most important platforms have several million sellers whereas the biggest supermarkets will 
have a maximum of a few thousand. 
11 M. Armstrong, ‘Competition in two-sided markets’, RAND Journal of Economics 2006, p. 684-686; A. Hagiu, 
‘Merchant or Two-Sided Platform?’, Review of Network Economics 2007, p. 1-19; M. Rysman, ‘The Economics 
of Two-Sided Markets’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2009, p. 125-143. 
12 For a discussion of developments in supermarket tracking of customers, see Turow, Joseph. The aisles have 
eyes: How retailers track your shopping, strip your privacy, and define your power. Yale University Press, 2017. 
 
8 
customers that platforms can reach (far larger than supermarkets) and b) the mechanisms of 
data collection (which appear more limited for supermarkets – such as loyalty cards). Based 
on those, it seems reasonable to assume that platforms’ datasets on customers are richer by 
orders of magnitude, and therefore allow for personalisation that is much more sophisticated 
(although structured attempts of quantifying or describing have yet to be undertaken). Scale 
and speed in the use of data online appear therefore as main differentiators between 
platforms and brick-and-mortar.   
This data gives the platform insights into the overall purchasing behaviour of consumers and 
trends in consumer preferences. The use of such information by the platform to the benefit 
of its vertically integrated activities may amount to self-favouring. In this regard, one of the 
potentially harmful practices identified by the Commission in its fact-finding exercise is the 
‘use of transaction data to learn from downstream competitors and improve online platforms’ 
own competing service’.13 The Amazon competition investigation initiated by the Commission 
in July 2019 seems to target such a scenario, as the press release states that ‘the Commission 
will focus on whether and how the use of accumulated marketplace seller data by Amazon as 
a retailer affects competition’.14 
While similar practices may occur in the context of supermarkets, their effects may not be as 
far-reaching as on online platforms. For instance, if a supermarket identifies a trend among 
consumers for a particular product that is offered by one of its suppliers, the supermarket can 
decide to develop its own-brand product with similar features, in order to extract more value 
from that particular market segment. However, in order to do so, it will need to invest in 
developing its own brand in order to compete with that supplier. Platforms, on the contrary, 
can decide to start selling the exact same product as offered by a business user – and possibly 
even against a lower price, because of their scale advantages – if the manufacturer is willing 
to supply the product. Alternatively, they can decide to start selling very similar products but 
which have a slightly lower price and/or some additional particular features that may make 
them more attractive to the customers. This way, without taking the same risk, the platform 
can compete intensely with businesses who took the risk in growing a market for a product 
whose success among consumers was not yet established at the initial launch of the product 
on the platform.  
Due to the way customers are presented with product options on a platform (via ranking of 
the results in response to a query, via recommendations of products etc.), platforms have the 
ability to direct the customers’ attention, in a focused manner, to certain products – arguably 
to a larger extent than supermarkets do. For instance, a customer searching for a product will 
likely look at the first few results a platform is presenting for that query, while a customer 
entering a supermarket will inevitably see a large variety of products). In case of certain 
                                                          
13 Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment – Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting fairness and transparency for business 
users of online intermediation services, SWD/2018/138 final, 26 April 2018, p. 16-17. 
14 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into possible anti-




platforms with a large market presence, this kind of influence can reach tens of millions of 
customers virtually at the same time. This is not possible in the case of supermarkets, where 
physical and logistic limitations constrain the number of customers who can be reached and 
extend the time needed to do so. As we show in section 5 below, platforms also may have the 
economic incentives to be biased in favour of certain products (which may be their own 
offerings or offerings of certain sellers). To summarise, in contrast to supermarkets, platforms 
appear to have more a) possibilities to adopt certain products very fast with limited risk and 
to reach a large number of customers instantly and b) incentives to differentiate between 
products/sellers in the way they are made visible on a platform. This combination makes such 
instances of differentiated treatment more problematic for the business users of online 
platforms than for suppliers of supermarkets. 
In conclusion, although it is clear that differentiated treatment is not an isolated phenomenon 
of the online platform economy, the effects of differentiation on online platforms differ 
considerably from the context of supermarkets due to differences in business models, scale 
and issues relating to the use of data and algorithms for personalisation that are specific to 
the online environment. As a result, the fact that differentiated treatment has so far not led 
to competition concerns in the context of supermarkets does not mean that equivalent 
practices should be tolerated in the online platform economy.  
 
2.2 Analogy with net neutrality  
Two types of non-discrimination obligations have been put in place for the telecom sector – 
EU net neutrality rules15 – and the non-discrimination obligation available within the regime 
applicable to telecom operators with significant market power (SMP)16. The Telecom Single 
Market Regulation lays down the principle of net neutrality for providers of electronic 
communications networks and services (including broadband providers), requiring them to 
treat all traffic ‘without discrimination, restriction or interference, and irrespective of the 
sender and receiver, the content accessed or distributed, the applications or services used or 
                                                          
15 Net neutrality rules imply that there should not be no blocking or throttling of online content, applications 
and services. All traffic needs to be treated equally. This means, for example, that there can be no paid 
prioritisation of traffic in the internet access service. At the same time, equal treatment allows reasonable day-
to-day traffic management according to justified technical requirements, and which must be independent of 
the origin or destination of the traffic and of any commercial considerations. Common rules on net neutrality 
mean that internet access providers cannot pick winners or losers on the internet, or decide which content 
and services are available. Service providers must be able to provide their services via a high-quality open 
internet and every European must be able to have access to the open internet. 
16 Article 7 of the EU's Electronic Communications Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) is one of the main EU 
instruments to ensure consistency of regulation of the telecoms sector. National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
must ensure that telecoms markets are competitive. If NRAs find that one or more market players have SMP, 
they should impose appropriate regulatory obligations (remedies) - including non-discrimination - to ensure 
effective competition. The notion of SMP is equivalent to the competition law concept of “dominance”, as 
defined in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Commission Recommendation 
(2013/466/EU) of 11 September 2013 on “consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing 
methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment” further 
specifies the non-discrimination obligation.  
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provided, or the terminal equipment used’.17 Net neutrality reflects the much older principle 
of common carriage.  The central concern that led to regulatory intervention was the ability 
of broadband providers to use their key position to distort competition and limit access of 
consumers to internet-based content and services.  
Intermediation services like online platforms, app stores but also certain device 
manufacturers (such as smartphones, tablets and personal voice assistants) are also 
important gateways to access content and other services on the internet. In this light, 
different reports (including from telecom bodies like BEREC and ARCEP)18 as well as 
literature19 have suggested to extend the net neutrality principle beyond the network and 
infrastructure layer to the device layer and application/service layer under the umbrella of 
‘platform neutrality’ or ‘device neutrality’. 
From a more technical perspective, there are differences as to what a neutrality obligation 
would entail for online platforms and devices as compared to the net neutrality principle that 
applies to electronic communications networks and services. Such a principle cannot be 
transposed one-to-one to online platforms, for instance so as to establish a form of ‘platform 
neutrality’, because differentiation is inherent in rankings on online platforms. The objective 
of a ranking is precisely to select the pieces of information that it considers most relevant to 
users. Its success in doing so is a core aspect of its value proposition toward end-users. There 
are many ways to operationalise relevance and platforms constantly adapt to changing user 
preferences and optimisation strategies. Thus, the way offerings are ranked and presented to 
users on online platforms requires a more complex trade-off than in electronic 
communications services. Any regulation with respect to the platform’s freedom to 
differentiate has to take account of this. The results matching a user’s query have to be 
displayed to the user at the same moment and in the same place, unlike internet traffic that 
                                                          
17 Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 
531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (Telecom Single Market 
Regulation) [2015] OJ L 310/1. 
18 See French Conseil National du Numérique, ‘Platform Neutrality: Building an open and sustainable digital 
environment’, May 2014, available at 
https://cnnumerique.fr/files/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf; French ARCEP, ‘Devices, the weak 
link in achieving an open internet. Report on their limitations and proposals for corrective measures’, February 
2018, available at  
https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gspublication/rapport-terminaux-fev2018-ENG.pdf; BEREC report on the 
impact of premium content on ECS markets and the effect of devices on the open use of the Internet, March 
2018, section 3 available at 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/8013-berec-report-on-the-
impact-of-premium-content-on-ecs-markets-and-the-effect-of-devices-on-the-open-use-of-the-internet; 
CERRE Issue paper by J. Krämer, ‘Device neutrality: the missing link for fair and transparent online 
competition?’, March 2019, available at 
https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/CERRE_DeviceNeutrality_IssuePaper_March2019_0.pdf. 
19 On search neutrality, see for instance: O. Bracha & F. Pasquale, ‘Federal Search Commission - Access, 
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search’ (2008) Cornell Law Review 1149; J. Grimmelmann, ‘Some 
Skepticism About Search Neutrality’ in Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus (eds.), The Next Digital Decade: Essays on 
the Future of the Internet (2010), 435; G.A. Manne & J.D. Wright, ‘If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What's 
the Question’ (2012) Columbia Business Law Review 151. 
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is delivered to users sequentially. These technical differences also illustrate that the working 
of rankings differs from how traffic over the internet is handled, so that differentiated 
treatment on online platforms may indeed require an assessment distinct from net neutrality.  
In addition, there is another distinguishing element to be taken into consideration: internet 
packets are basically the same from a technical point of view (heavily standardised), and 
hence the service offered by different operators who might engage in differentiated 
treatment are basically highly mutually substitutable from a consumer perspective. The 
situation is different in the platform world where platforms are not substitutable, and 
consumers multi-home more than in the telecom sector; they would have accounts on several 
platforms on which the products supplied would be different, for instance on e-commerce 
market places for mass products versus handy-craft products. 
While above-mentioned reports by European regulators point at potentially problematic 
practices related to notions of platform and device neutrality, an immediate imposition of a 
general obligation of non-discrimination for platforms or devices does not seem suitable or 
desirable, considering the – so far – inconclusive findings about the impact of differentiated 
treatment – as illustrated below in sections 4, 5 and 6. In addition, simply extending net 
neutrality regulation to platforms would ignore different technical underpinning of these 
services. Appropriate regulatory intervention may need to be devised but this appears 
premature at this stage, especially since not all forms of differentiated treatment will have 
equally negative effects. On the basis of preliminary research from a technical, economic and 
legal perspective, sections 4-6 below discuss more specifically which types of differentiated 
treatment appear most problematic and would thus deserve further scrutiny.      
 
3 Different interests involved: those of consumers, 
businesses, and the platform 
Before moving to specific technical, economic and legal insights into differentiated treatment 
by platforms, it is worthwhile to point out the different interests that are at stake. Online 
platforms pursue their own commercial interests and, because of their multi-sidedness, they 
have to cater to both businesses as well as consumers. Beyond the specific interests of these 
three actors (the platform, its business users, and consumers), there are also broader societal 
concerns relating to the selection and prioritisation of offerings by platforms. By disrupting 
and transforming value chains, platforms have the capacity to undercut existing regulatory 
approaches, raising issues in intellectual property, labour law, and regulation of hotels and 
transport services. By optimising the matchmaking function between suppliers and end-users, 
platforms may also generate significant externalities, transforming people’s living 
environments in the process. Platforms have become essential facilitators and mediators of 
democratic processes, including access to factual information, news, political campaigning 
and public debate. In all of this, platforms, due to their increasing power, help to determine 
the winners and losers in ways that may not be transparent, legitimate or properly informed 
by and accountable to the principles of democracy. These are good reasons to consider the 
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public interest as a fourth interested party that may be detrimentally affected by business 
models organised around the maximisation of user engagement metrics.20 
On a more immediate level, the need to keep consumers satisfied means that platforms do 
not have an unlimited ability to engage in differentiated treatment. For instance, once the 
more favourable display of one’s own offerings in a ranking significantly lowers the quality of 
the service, such a form of self-preferencing can at some point reduce consumer participation 
into the platform. Depending on the strength of the position of the platform, the market may 
self-correct so that competition constrains the scope for differentiated treatment at least to 
a certain extent. Where the market position of the platform is strong or consumers do not 
switch or multi-home (out of convenience or for another reason), however, consumer 
preferences can to a large extent be shaped by the platform. 
As regards the interests of businesses, it is important to recognise that platforms provide 
significant benefits by enabling businesses to target a wide audience that typically exceeds 
the territory of individual Member States and even beyond. In the absence of platforms who 
act as intermediaries between business users and consumers, small enterprises in particular 
would not have had equally effective possibilities to reach consumers. While platforms 
constitute a key entry point for businesses to access certain markets, platforms rely on the 
presence of businesses in order to create value for consumers. Because of this mutual 
dependency, competition may constrain the extent to which a platform can successfully 
engage in differentiated treatment if unsatisfied businesses can switch to an alternative 
platform. However, the ability for business to switch or multi-home depends on the strength 
of competition in the market. 
The platform has an interest in protecting the quality of its service and in recouping its 
investments. To prevent a decrease in innovation incentives of platforms in the long term, 
leeway to design their business in a way that allows them to recoup their initial investment is 
likely justified, even if this results in the lack of enforcement of a principle to treat all 
businesses in similar situations alike. At the same time, differentiated treatment should not 
be tolerated if it creates harm that a platform cannot justify on the basis of legitimate reasons. 
The adoption of some obligations - such as for example the transparency requirements with 
regard to differentiated treatment set out in the Platform-to-Business Regulation21 - 
therefore constitute an appropriate first regulatory step.  
As a result, the starting point for our analysis is that platforms should be granted a certain 
degree of discretion in deciding how to design their platform, so that some level of 
                                                          
20 While conclusive empirical evidence is still lacking, the high visibility of disinformation and controversial 
political content on social media (e.g. Allgaier Joachim, 2019. Science and Environmental Communication on 
YouTube: Strategically Distorted Communications in Online Videos on Climate Change and Climate 
Engineering. In: Frontiers in Communication 4) may be due to search and recommendation systems privileging 
information that ‘activates’ users more strongly. While social media platforms are not replacing other media 
channels, their very high user numbers, penetration rates, and reliance on algorithmic ordering raises specific 
questions. 
21 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting 




differentiation is to be regarded as inherent in their functioning – just like in any other 
segment of the economy. In addition, one should keep in mind that it is impossible to 
reconcile all interests, implying that it is inevitable for one interest to prevail over others in a 
particular situation. A platform needs to be able to get a return on its investments so that 
some promotion of its own activities may be justified, even though this at the same time can 
harm businesses that get less exposure to consumers. EU competition law, however, is an 
important limit in situations where self-favouring creates anticompetitive effects that harm 
businesses as well as consumers. A platform may have legitimate reasons22 to downgrade or 
even delist a particular offering to protect consumers against low quality services and to guard 
the reputation of its platform. This implies that not every instance of differentiated treatment 
is problematic. At the same time, some forms of differentiated treatment can have far-
reaching consequences for the viability of businesses that are dependent on platforms, so 
that further measures for such situations may be necessary. The purpose of the analysis 
presented in the next sections is to draw insights from a technical, economic, and legal 
perspective on how harmful effects from differentiated treatment can be assessed.  
 
4 Technical insights into rankings 
To better understand the various issues surrounding ranking, it is necessary to clarify a 
number of points, starting from the recognition that ranking and similar techniques 
necessarily engage in differentiated treatment when information and what it stands for is put 
into a particular order or sequence. As Grimmelman argues23, search engines and other 
automated information systems face the dilemma that they have to rank and differentiate to 
be useful in the first place. Systems that suggest, promote, classify or filter items operate 
under similar imperatives to differentiate.  A fully randomised search engine would be 
useless, but the specific criteria used still imply some interpretation of potentially contested 
terms such as relevance, quality, or authority. Five aspects are particularly salient in this 
context: 
First, as Ciborra24 and others have argued, information technology reduces the three factors 
originally identified by Coase25 that weigh on transaction cost: search, contracting, and 
control over execution. In Coase’s perspective, these factors introduce costs that limit the use 
of the pricing mechanism as coordination principle and make it profitable to organise 
economic activities through firms. The lowering of transaction cost through information 
                                                          
22 Examples of such legitimate reasons one might think of include: delisting of illegal content; prohibiting of 
offers contrary to the nature of the platform, but not illegal (e.g. mass manufactured products on handmade-
only platforms; pornographic material on platforms aimed at children), which is this is especially important to 
consider since platform specialisation is a competitive strategy to survive next to the big platforms; and finally, 
the asks to downrank low quality content in the context of disinformation. 
23 Grimmelmann, James. (2009) The Google Dilemma. 53 New York Law School Law Review 939. 
24 Ciborra, Claudio U. (1985). ‘Reframing the Role of Computers in Organizations: The Transaction Costs 
Approach’, in: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, ed. Lynn Gallegos, 
Richard Welke and James C. Wetherbe, Chicago: Society of Information Management, 57-69. 
25 Coase, Ronald H. (1937). ‘The Nature of the Firm’, in: Economica, vol. 4, no. 16, 386-405. 
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technology along these three axes has made it possible to organise many economic sectors 
around the large-scale and potentially globe-spanning marketplaces for “items” of all kinds 
(messages on social media sites, products offered by online retailers, web sites indexed by 
search engines, potential partners on dating sites, units of housing for real estate or short-
term rental services, driving services or other forms of labor in the “gig economy”, etc.). In 
this context, ranking and similar gestures serve as the principal means to structure and 
manage connections between market participants, influencing the matching between offer 
and demand. The Web, for example, holds billions of documents and a user query can easily 
match millions of them. Ranking uses many different factors or signals to assess notions such 
as relevance, quality, authority, fit, and so forth. Users are thus presented with a reduced and 
ordered subset of items, conferring considerable power to the techniques in question. 
Second, ranking is only one relevant form of “information ordering” and from a technical 
perspective in particular, it is closely related to activities like filtering, classifying, or 
recommending.26 In many cases, similar algorithmic techniques are used, the difference 
between these gestures becoming a matter of interface design. In all of these cases, the goal 
is similar: a potentially large number of “items” are being made available to users and their 
sheer mass can lead to disorientation or information overload, as users’ attention and 
cognitive capacity are limited. Ordering mechanisms that filter, classify, recommend, or rank 
these items seek to present users with a more structured perspective on what is on offer to 
reduce cognitive weight. We can distinguish three broad settings: 
• Users actively search for items, generally by formulating a query that describes a 
product or piece of information. Interfaces often provide structured means to further 
specify the query, e.g. through the selection of a product category, a price range, or a 
publication date. 
• The system itself “suggests” or “recommends” items to users without asking them 
explicitly. While quite different from a user perspective, the underlying technical 
principles are similar: instead of using search terms, many different signals can take 
the place of a query, for example a user’s profile and transaction history, their 
geographical location, the device they are using, and so forth. 
• A combination of both, where explicit user requests are combined with “contextual” 
information that weighs on selection and ranking. This is generally referred to as 
personalisation. 
All three settings can be organised in dynamic ways, where results are generated in real-time 
and may change over time based on interaction history, changes in the database of items, or 
the behaviour of other users. 
Third, while techniques like ranking are at the heart of practices like search and 
recommendation, it is important to distinguish three “stages” of the retrieval process that can 
all have effects on the eventual matching between users and items: 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Garcia-Molina, Hector, Georgia Koutrika, and Aditya Parameswaran. 2011. ‘Information 




• Selection concerns the identification of relevant items, i.e. the construction of a 
pool of items to consider for output. While this may seem straightforward, this 
stage already implies an interpretation of what is on offer and various techniques 
allow for a widening or contraction of the initial selection. Web search engines, for 
example, use synonyms to retrieve documents that may actually not contain the 
initial user query. Recommender systems often compare users to define lists of 
items from “similar” users as potential candidates. A company may organise 
selection in potentially problematic ways, e.g. by organising the underlying 
informational grid in self-serving ways.  
• Ordering implies the arrangement of selected items, often – but not always – into 
a sequence: a list of search results, a set of recommendations, or an algorithmic 
timeline of social media messages make fine-grained distinctions between items, 
giving prominence to some over others. At the heart of this process sits an 
algorithmic decision model that defines the signals taken into account. The many 
different and frequently changing27 factors that influence this process can make it 
hard to make overall assessments: depending on the chosen algorithmic technique 
and the specific domain, ordering can provide many different directions for 
problematic behaviour. As Brin and Page note in the annex to their paper on what 
was to become Google, ‘a search engine could add a small factor to search results 
from “friendly” companies, and subtract a factor from results from competitors. 
This type of bias is very difficult to detect but could still have a significant effect on 
the market’.28 
• Interface design gives concrete visual and navigable form to selection and 
ordering, defining the actual effort users have to invest to move beyond the first 
result. Design issues have been discussed around the separation of paid and 
“organic” results on web search engines and they become increasingly relevant in 
the context of mobile devices: the results page on Google Search, for example, 
now requires significant scrolling to reach “organic” results below advertisements 
and the various types of info-boxes. While design questions are not identical to 
the previous points, they can have a clear effect on user behaviour and are 
therefore relevant aspects of a larger matching process. The spread of voice 
assistants29 means that auditory interfaces are increasingly relevant and these 
tend to move away from lists to a “single answer” format, adding another 
dimension to these issues.  
                                                          
27 Some several hundreds of changes to factors can be made every year. In settings where machine learning is 
used, the number of variables taken into account and the probability relationships between features and 
target variables are in constant flux. 
28 Brin S and Page L (1998) The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual web search engine. Available at: 
http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/, p.18. 





Separating these three stages can help us get a better grip on the complex technical 
dimensions involved. While neither is problematic per se, they define different directions for 
organising the matching process in ways that may be undesirable. 
Fourth, while the various aspects of the matching process involve many explicit instances of 
design, the decision models at the heart of ranking and recommendation are increasingly 
dynamic, personalised and automatic. One problem is that the behaviour of each market 
participant can affect the outcomes for all the others: if competitors “improve” their 
websites, e.g. through search engine optimisation, a company’s online presence may drop in 
visibility without any doing of their own. But more importantly, techniques like machine 
learning have the effect that the decision models themselves can change quickly and are no 
longer the same for each user. The canonical example is spam filtering: when messages arrive 
in a user’s inbox, they can decide to mark them as spam or not. Every time a message is 
labeled that way, the “features” it contains, e.g. individual words, form indicative 
relationships with the output class or “target variable”, in this case spam or not-spam. If a 
word often appears in messages marked as spam, it will become an indicator for the spam 
category. Once the classifier has been “trained” this way, it can begin to rank or discard 
incoming emails according to their predicted “spamminess”. Instead of defining a reduced 
number of defining characteristics into a set formula, every single word or other feature can 
be taken into account to “allow many small and individually ambiguous clues to combine and 
interact”.30 Millions of variables can thus come into play. Any kind of ordering process can be 
organised this way, given the availability of user feedback: taking behaviour as “revealed 
preference”31 means that a user’s transaction history can be used to define a decision model 
that applies only to them and potentially changes over time. 
Fifth, one of the consequences of a more nuanced (technical) appreciation of ranking and 
similar processes is a certain hesitancy when it comes to notions such as transparency. While 
complex technical systems can be described in broad terms, the distinction between 
“algorithm” and “data” becomes increasingly problematic when decision models are 
generated on the basis of feedback rather than explicit design. At the same time, techniques 
are developed to make algorithmic decisions more “explainable”32. Such approaches may 
bridge the space between the broad assessment of problematic behaviour and the actual 
techniques relying on non-anthropomorphic forms of decision-making or “reasoning” 
operating in the background, but they may also require significant effort when it comes to 
implementation33, increasing the burden of compliance. 
                                                          
30 Spärck Jones, Karen (1999). ‘Information Retrieval and Artificial Intelligence’, in: Artificial Intelligence, vol. 
114, 257-281, p.228. 
31 Samuelson, Paul A. (1948). ‘Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference’, in: Economica, vol. 15, 
no. 60, 243-253. 
32 Voosen, Paul (2017, July 16). ‘How AI Detectives are Cracking Open the Black Box of Deep Learning’, in 
Science AAAS, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/07/how-ai-detectives-are-cracking-open-black-box-
deep-learning 
33 While research on “explainability” is advancing, there is little experience with the use of relevant techniques 
in operational settings. Designing a system in a way that the main factors going into decisions can be 
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In conclusion, rankings bring about important benefits by ordering and selecting information 
among the wealth of sources available. Differentiation is inherent in the way rankings 
operate, as their purpose is to pick the most relevant pieces of information and present them 
to users in a particular order of priority. By determining what information or offerings users 
will see, rankings have considerable power. While it may be possible to define problematic, 
unfair or illegal differentiated treatment in principle, it may be very difficult to establish such 
practices in practice. Platforms rarely make detailed information and first-hand data available 
and practices like personalisation and localisation make it difficult to establish a clear picture 
of the actual outcomes of ordering procedures. And even if such data were made available, 
the number of variables involved in ranking processes creates a form of opacity that makes 
causality elusive. An additional challenge comes from the limited capacity of some bodies (e.g. 
public administrations) to comprehend ranking underpinning systems. While the 
observatory’s report on measurement provides further details concerning both problems and 
solutions pertaining to ranking, one can distinguish three broad strategies for creating greater 
clarity and transparency: 
• platforms can grant access to internal processes, for example through data 
sharing, reporting, or technical audits; 
• (business) users can become a source of information, for example through 
polling or mechanisms for making complaints34; 
• techniques like web scraping can create first-hand data on actual results of 
ordering processes and even personalisation and localisation can be dealt with 
given sufficient investment35;36      
Depending on the specific platform under scrutiny, one or a combination of these three 
strategies could be applied to monitor the actual outcomes of ordering processes – the 
equivalent of checking the shelves in a supermarket – in cases were sufficient reasons for 
suspicion are given. Since there are many open questions concerning details, we recommend 
prioritising finding solutions for the problems concerning the observability of differentiated 
treatment by platforms arising from techniques such as personalisation and localisation. 
 
                                                          
communicated to end-users or regulators may actually be technically challenging and require significant 
engineering and design effort. 
34 It is relevant to mention that Art.11 of the Platform-to-Business Regulation provides for a complaint 
handling mechanism.   
35 It is worth noting that the Commission is currently commissioning a study on such tools, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/call-tenders-exploratory-study-governance-and-
accountability-mechanisms-algorithmic-systems 
36 The German Datenspende project (https://datenspende.algorithmwatch.org), for example, asked users to 
install a small browser extension to study Google search results for political candidates during the last 
parliamentary elections. With over 4000 participants, effects of personalisation and localisation could be 
sufficiently accounted for. 
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5 Economic insights 
Although there is a large economic literature on net neutrality37  exploring whether allowing 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to discriminate on the business side - content providers - is 
welfare-improving or not, the literature about discrimination on the business side by a B2C 
platform is pretty thin. Note that the net neutrality literature examines not only the impact 
of discrimination on static welfare but also on the innovation incentives of both content 
providers and ISP(s). In what follows, we study practices of differentiated treatment by 
platforms and evaluate them by using both static and dynamic welfare criteria.  
Three types of differentiation are distinguished, based on the distinction made in EU 
competition law between exclusionary and exploitative behaviour. Exclusionary behaviour 
risks foreclosing competitors from the market, thereby diminishing competition on the basis 
of parameters like price, quality and innovation. Exploitative behaviour consists of practices 
that exploit businesses and/or consumers through, for instance, excessive prices or unfair 
contract terms. Differentiated treatment can be either exclusionary or exploitative, or contain 
a mix of exclusionary and exploitative elements. To categorise practices of differentiated 
treatment in line with their exclusionary and/or exploitative character, a distinction can be 
made between: (1) cases of ‘pure’ self-favouring whereby a vertically integrated platform 
treats its own services more favourably than those of others (for instance, the more 
prominent display of Google’s comparison shopping service in its general search results as 
compared to rival comparison shopping services); (2) cases of ‘pure’ secondary line 
differentiation whereby a non-vertically integrated platform differentiates between non-
affiliated services in a market in which it is not active itself (for instance, a hotel booking 
platform providing hotels that pay more commission fees with a higher ranking); and (3) 
‘hybrid’ cases where a platform differentiates among non-affiliated services in an effort to 
favour its own business (for instance, an app store blocking an app that interferes with its 
ability to gain revenues through advertising). In competition law, pure self-favouring more 
typically qualifies as an exclusionary practice, while pure secondary line differentiation more 
typically concerns exploitative behaviour. Differentiation of the hybrid category consists of 
both exclusionary and exploitative elements.38 
In the following sections, we analyse these three categories. First, section 5.1 provides an 
extensive discussion of recommendation bias (i.e. favouring certain products in platforms’ 
recommendations) by both vertically integrated platforms and non-integrated ones. Then, 
section 5.2 focuses on pure self-favouring by vertically integrated platforms specifically. 
 
                                                          
37 For a survey, see S. Greenstein, M. Peitz & T. Valletti, ‘Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the 
Trade-Offs’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2016, p. 127-150. 
38 This typology is based on I. Graef, ‘Differentiated treatment in platform-to-business relations: EU 




5.1 Recommendation bias 
Even if our focus is on the incentives for pure self-favouring by vertically integrated platforms, 
we start by examining various incentives for recommendation bias that exist both for 
vertically integrated platforms and non-integrated platforms. The current section is closely 
related to section 4 on ranking as recommendation bias can take the form of bias in the 
ordering of search results.  
 
5.1.1 A simple framework to understand basic incentives for recommendation bias 
Let us provide a simple framework in order to explain recommendation bias. Consider a two-
sided platform that mediates interactions between a mass of sellers and a mass of consumers. 
Sellers compete for the consumers and the consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their 
match value with each seller, i.e. the surplus they obtain by trading with each seller. As 
consumers do not know their match values, they rely on the platform’s recommendation to 
decide which seller to trade with. Assume for simplicity that for each given consumer, there 
are two relevant sellers (called seller A and seller B): the consumer obtains positive net surplus 
by trading any of the two.  
We below consider two different criteria to define recommendation bias – consumer surplus 
maximisation and social welfare maximisation.  
Let ‘b’ represent the bias such that when b is equal to zero, the recommendation is unbiased. 
We can first define recommendation bias from consumers’ point of view as follows: 
recommendation is biased toward seller A by “b(>0)” from consumers’ point of view if the 
platform recommends seller A whenever the net consumer surplus generated by seller B is 
lower than b plus the net surplus generated by seller A. Given this definition of bias, it seems 
rational for a two-sided platform to introduce some bias. This is because social welfare is 
maximised when the recommendation is based on the total surplus generated on both sides 
instead of the net surplus generated on the consumer side. In other words, even if a consumer 
prefers seller A to seller B in terms of net surplus, if seller B generates more profit than seller 
A such that the profit difference is higher than the consumer net surplus difference, welfare 
maximisation requires recommending B to the consumer.  
We can also define recommendation bias from a welfare point of view as follows: 
recommendation is biased toward seller A by “b(>0)” from a welfare point of view if the 
platform recommends seller A whenever the total surplus generated by seller B is lower than 
b plus the total surplus generated by seller A. In what follows, we examine whether a platform 
has an incentive to engage in recommendation bias from a welfare point of view. 
Consider first a non-integrated platform and examine when it has an incentive to engage in 
pure secondary-line differentiation by introducing recommendation bias.  In this case, the 
platform maximises its own profit generated by the commissions (per transaction) it receives 
from the sellers. Therefore, its recommendation would be biased toward seller A when the 
commission from seller A is larger than the one from seller B.  
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For instance, Bourreau and Gaudin (2018) consider a distribution platform such as Pandora 
or Spotify. In their paper, the platform does not have its own content and thus hosts content 
from different content providers, which charge different royalty rates per consumption. This 
generates an incentive for the platform to bias its recommendation toward the content 
provider charging a lower royalty.39 In fact, Pandora engaged into a special agreement with 
the indie-label coalition Merlin in 2014, whereby Merlin would accept reduced royalty rates 
in exchange for an increased performance of its titles.40 
We now ask when the platform has an incentive to engage in pure self-favouring through 
recommendation bias. Suppose that seller A is vertically integrated with the platform while 
seller B is independent. Then, the platform would bias recommendation toward A if A’s profit 
per transaction is larger than the commission that it obtains from B. For instance, even if seller 
B’s product generates a higher net consumer surplus and a higher profit margin than seller 
A’s product, the integrated platform would recommend A when it does not fully extract B’s 
profit and hence A’s profit is larger than the commission from B.  
The simple framework shows that a vertically integrated platform and a non-integrated one 
have some similarity in terms of incentives to bias recommendation. The former will bias 
recommendation toward a vertically integrated product if the profit from recommending the 
product is higher than the commission from recommending an alternative product of an 
independent seller. A similar force induces a non-integrated platform to bias 
recommendation toward products generating high commissions and against products 
generating low commissions.  
We can also study when the platform has an incentive to engage in hybrid differentiation.  For 
this purpose, suppose that both sellers are independent but that their sale through the 
platform requires some complementary service. Each seller can use a service provided by the 
platform or a service provided by a third-party and the use of the platform’s service generates 
some profit to the platform. Then, the platform may bias its recommendation toward the 
sellers who use the vertically integrated service and against those who do not use it.  
Without reaching a conclusion on whether these practices are acceptable or not, we would 
like to emphasise that a platform may use recommendation bias to enforce its own terms of 
trade with respect to business users such as promoting the use of its own logistics services or 
discouraging business users from offering lower prices on rival platforms etc. For instance, 
when a publisher did not capitulate during a negotiation for fees for ancillary services, 
Amazon shut off the recommendation algorithm for its books and the publisher’s sales fell by 
as much as 40 percent.41 
 
                                                          
39 M. Bourreau & G. Gaudin, ‘Streaming Platforms and Recommendation Bias’, CESifoWorking Paper No. 7390, 
2018. 
40 https://rainnews.com/pandora-proposes-lowered-music-royalty-rates-based-steering-merlin-agreement/ 
41 B. Stone, The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon, Back Bay 2013. 
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5.1.2  Other motives for recommendation bias  
 We below examine other various motives for recommendation bias that can be applied to 
both vertically integrated platforms and non-integrated ones. 
In case of attention platforms such as Facebook and Youtube that harvest users’ attention 
and sell it to advertisers, their recommendation algorithm is programmed to boost users’ 
engagement, which may be in serious conflict with maximisation of social welfare or 
promotion of democracy. For instance, engagement-maximising algorithm tends to 
recommend partisan news which generate fear and outrage since this creates emotional state 
open to engagement.42  
Many online platforms sell prominent positions. This practice may have a consequence of 
discriminating against small business users as it may favour large and established companies 
with superior access to financial resources over new market entrants and SMEs. A similar 
concern has been raised regarding slotting allowances in the supermarket context discussed 
above in section 2.1. Such discrimination would reduce competition among business users 
especially if consumers pay attention only to top positions. Furthermore, platforms may have 
an incentive to induce such behaviour of consumers by filling lower positions with irrelevant 
products, effectively creating a sort of monopoly power for the sellers buying top positions.43 
In fact, Ursu (2018) suggests that ranking can be used to generate market power. Using data 
from Expedia on hotel booking, Ursu (2018) estimates a demand model with consumer search 
and uses it to run a counterfactual in which the hotels displayed under Expedia's ranking are 
reordered according to expected utility of consumers.44 In all 4 destinations in her data utility-
based rankings increase consumer welfare, by up to 49 percent. Reductions in search costs 
only explain a minor part of consumer welfare gains. Also, the number of transactions 
increases under utility-based ranking but total revenues fall in 3 of the 4 destinations. The 
most likely explanation is that utility-based ranking shows consumers less expensive hotels 
than rankings used by Expedia.  
As consumers do not internalise the profits made on the seller side when they perform a 
search, they tend to conduct a lesser amount of search than what is desirable from social 
welfare point of view. This generates an incentive for a platform to divert search to induce 
consumers to engage in more search and thereby to discover more products. Search diversion 
has long been prominent feature of offline retail intermediaries: retailers often place the most 
sought-after items at the back or upper floors of their stores (e.g. bread and milk at 
supermarkets), while shopping malls design their layout to maximise the distance traveled by 
visitors between anchor stores.45 According to the theoretical work of Hagiu and Jullien (2011, 
2014), search diversion is widespread among online platforms and, for instance, e-commerce 
sites design their websites in order to divert users' attention away from the products they 
were initially looking for, and towards the discovery of products that they might be interested 
                                                          
42 R. McNamee, Zucked: Waking Up to the Facebook Catastrophe, Penguin Press 2019. 
43 J. Crémer, Y.-A. De Montjoye & H. Schweitzer, Competition policy for the digital era, 2019, p. 62. 
44 R.M. Ursu, ‘The Power of Rankings’, Marketing Science, 37(4), p. 530-552, 2018 
45 H. Petroski, Small Things Considered: Why There Is No Perfect Design, Knopf 2003. 
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in and eventually buy (unsolicited products or advertising).46 Search diversion does not 
necessarily reduce welfare as consumers conduct suboptimal level of search at the first place 
although platforms may engage in excessive search diversion toward high margin products.  
A dominant platform can exercise its monopsonic power with respect to business users.47 The 
monopsonic power is enhanced by the use of a recommendation algorithm as a bargaining 
chip. The exercise of monopsonic power can squeeze the profit margin of business users and 
thereby reduce their incentives to innovate. In addition, the recommendation algorithm 
affects product diversity by deciding which products get prominence. For instance, a group of 
authors calling themselves Authors United claim that Amazon’s exercise of market power 
reduced book diversity by making publishers ‘dropping some midlist authors and not 
publishing certain riskier books, effectively silencing many voices’, which eventually harms 
consumers.48  
An interesting question to study is how recommendation bias affects competition and 
incentives to innovate. De Cornière and Taylor (forthcoming) provide a general analysis that 
encompasses various modes of competition. They distinguish two cases depending on 
whether a seller’s and its customers’ payoffs are conflicting or congruent. They are conflicting 
(congruent) if giving more surplus to customers requires the seller to reduce (increase) its 
profit margin. In the case of price competition, the payoffs are conflicting. In the case of price 
and quality competition, they are congruent if products are not much differentiated and/or 
the marginal cost of quality increase is small. They find that the bias toward a seller reduces 
overall consumer surplus in the case of conflict while it may raise it in the case of 
congruence.49 Although very interesting, De Cornière and Taylor (forthcoming) intentionally 
abstract from any contracting between the platform and seller(s). Hence, it is hard to 
extrapolate their findings to the more realistic situation in which such contracting takes place. 
What is missing in the literature is the analysis of an equilibrium recommendation bias for a 
two-sided platform that offers tariffs to one or both sides. We expect that platforms that 
extract surplus from both sides have fewer incentives to bias recommendation than those 
who make money only from seller/advertiser side. 
In summary, platforms have various incentives to bias their recommendations. They may bias 
recommendations toward high margin products or vertically integrated services; they may 
use recommendation bias to enforce their own terms of trade with respect to business users; 
dominant platforms may even have an incentive to fill low positions by recommending 
irrelevant products in order to sell monopoly power to those buying top positions. This 
analysis of incentives for platforms to bias recommendations is without prejudice to the 
question of whether such behaviour is to be tolerated or not, which would merit further 
                                                          
46 A. Hagiu & B. Jullien, ‘Why do intermediaries divert search?’, RAND Journal of Economics 2011, p. 337-362; 
A. Hagiu & B. Jullien, ‘Search diversion and platform competition’, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 2014, p. 48-60. 
47 P. Krugman, ‘Amazon’s Monopsony Is Not OK’, The New York Times, 19 October 2014, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/paul-krugman-amazons-monopsony-is-not-ok.html.  
48 V. Vara, ‘Is Amazon Creating a Cultural Monopoly?’, The New Yorker, 23 August 2015, available at 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/is-amazon-creating-a-cultural-monopoly.  
49 A. De Cornière & G. Taylor, ‘A Model of Biased Intermediation’, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
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analysis. In some cases, recommendation biases could be very problematic depending, for 
instance, on the platform’s market power or the inability of businesses to switch. 
 
5.2 Pure self-favouring by vertically integrated platforms. 
We now consider pure self-favouring by a vertically integrated platform. Pure self-favouring 
by a platform can take the form of high prices or unfavourable treatments through biased 
recommendations or limiting data access. We first review the main insights from the large 
literature on the incentives for a vertically integrated firm to engage in vertical foreclosure50 
and apply it to online platforms. And then we study self-favouring in terms of limiting data 
access. 
 
5.2.1 Applying to online platforms main lessons from the literature on vertical integration 
and vertical foreclosure 
Consider for instance an upstream monopolist that is vertically integrated with a downstream 
firm. The integrated downstream firm faces competition from another downstream firm. 
Does the integrated firm that has upstream monopoly power have an incentive to foreclose 
the downstream rival? 
According to the Chicago school, the vertically integrated firm has no incentive to engage in 
vertical foreclosure even if it has the ability to do it. For instance, suppose that the rival firm 
produces the same final good as the downstream unit of the integrated firm but at a lower 
marginal cost. Then, the integrated firm has an incentive to sell its monopoly input to the rival 
as long as it can share the extra profit generated by the lower cost of production. 
However, there are three different arguments that restore the vertical foreclosure incentive. 
One argument that makes the Chicago school logic invalid is based on “imperfect surplus 
extraction”. Suppose that in the above situation, a regulator adopts some cost-based 
regulation of the monopoly input price such that it chooses an upper bound of the price that 
is lower than the surplus the input generates. Hence, the integrated firm cannot extract the 
whole surplus generated by its input if it sells the input to the rival. Then, it has an incentive 
to engage in vertical foreclosure. By doing so, it becomes a monopolist in the downstream 
market and can charge a monopoly price to the final good, thereby extracting the whole 
surplus generated by both the upstream and downstream units.  
This argument based on imperfect surplus extraction is relevant when we consider two-sided 
platforms, since it seems hard to expect a platform to fully extract the whole surplus of 
business users. For instance, the tariffs that a platform applies to business users are typically 
not personalised, making full surplus extraction impossible. In addition, no seller will incur the 
cost of joining a platform if it expects the full surplus being extracted. 
                                                          
50 For a survey, see C. Fumagalli, M. Motta & C. Calcagno, Exclusionary Practices: The Economics of 
Monopolisation and Abuse of Dominance, Cambridge University Press 2018. 
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A second argument is based on the “incentive to limit competition”. Ideally, the integrated 
firm would like to realise a monopolistic outcome, which requires limiting the total amount 
of output sold by the downstream firms. Suppose that the rival downstream firm is more 
efficient than the downstream unit of the integrated firm. Then, efficiency requires the 
former to produce more than the latter, which will occur for instance if the integrated firm 
sells the input at a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost (and realises a profit by receiving 
a fixed payment). However, as long as the integrated firm is unable to commit to the amount 
of output its downstream unit will produce, selling the input at the marginal cost leads both 
firms to sell too much output relative to the monopoly output.51 Therefore, in order to reduce 
the total output, the integrated firm will sell the input to the rival at a wholesale price much 
larger than the marginal cost of production, which leads to a partial or complete foreclosure 
of the rival even when it is more efficient.   
The first argument based on “imperfect surplus extraction” can explain why a platform may 
maintain the operation of a downstream unit even when it is less efficient than the rival. Once 
a vertically integrated downstream unit is under operation, the second argument based on 
the “incentive to limit competition” kicks in and induces the platform to engage in partial or 
complete foreclosure of the rival firm. This argument is relevant whenever platforms’ 
integrated services face competition from business users.  
A third argument that invalidates the Chicago school logic is based on network effects. 
Suppose that there are two periods such that in each period there are N number of new 
consumers who buy the final good. In addition, suppose that there are network effects such 
that period-two consumers prefer to buy the final good produced by the firm whose final 
good was chosen by period-one consumers. Then, the vertically integrated firm has an 
incentive to “deny scale to the rival” by refusing to sell the input to the rival even if welfare 
maximisation requires the same network effects to be enjoyed by the rival firm that has a 
lower cost of production. In addition, the rival may have an incentive to enter the upstream 
monopoly segment once its downstream market position is strengthened by the network 
effects. As entry into the monopoly segment threatens the main profit source of the 
integrated firm, it has an even stronger incentive to engage in vertical foreclosure. 
This argument based on network effects is pretty relevant to a two-sided platform since 
network effects on the same side or across two sides are a salient feature of two-sided 
platforms.52 For instance, due to data-driven network effects, the larger the consumer base 
of an application, the higher the quality of its service, creating a tendency for market tipping. 
This triggers a race for scale, generating a strong incentive for vertical foreclosure. In addition, 
once the market for an important application tips toward a rival, the rival may have an 
                                                          
51 O. Hart & J. Tirole, ‘Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
(Microeconomics) 1990, p. 205-285; P. Rey & J. Tirole, ‘A Primer on Forecloure’, Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 2005, vol. III, North Holland, 2005, p. 2145-2220; M. Reisinger & E. Tarantino, ‘Vertical 
Integration, Foreclosure and Productive Efficiency’, RAND Journal of Economics 2015, p. 461-479. 
52 Choi and Jeon (forthcoming) provides a leverage theory of tying in the presence of intergroup network 
effects in two-sided markets. J. P. Choi and D.-S. Jeon, ‘A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with 
Non-Negative Price Constraints’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming  
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incentive to grow to become an alternative platform. Anticipating such threat, an incumbent 
platform has an extra incentive to engage in vertical foreclosure.  
Pure self-favouring generates static welfare loss by making rival business users’ services less 
attractive as well as dynamic loss by inducing the exit of rivals or by weakening their incentives 
to invest. This harm from self-favouring should be compared with its benefit. Pure self-
favouring may improve static efficiency by eliminating double marginalisation and can also 
induce a platform to invest more at the platform level or at the level of integrated 
products/services. 
When platform competition is vigorous and consumers face low switching costs, platforms 
are likely to engage in pure self-favouring only if this increases consumer surplus. Otherwise, 
self-favouring will induce many consumers to switch to rival platforms. In contrast, when 
platforms have strong market power (either because they are dominant or because 
consumers single-home and face high switching costs), they have incentives to engage in pure 
self-favouring even if this reduces consumer surplus since very few consumers will switch 
even if they are harmed.  
In summary, all the three explanations – imperfect rent extraction, competition-limiting 
incentive, incentive to deny scale – for vertical foreclosure are relevant to platforms with 
strong market power. When platforms are dominant or when consumers single-home and 
face high switching costs, vertically integrated platforms can have an incentive to engage in 
anticompetitive pure self-favouring. For instance, according to a recent analysis of the App 
Store by the New York Times,53 since Apple added its apps to the App Store in June 2016, it 
has been the top result for many popular search terms. Those Apple apps held on for years 
while top rivals remained stuck below, sometimes hundreds of spots down the list. 
5.2.2 Differentiated data access by vertically integrated B2C platforms 
Online platforms obtain massive amount of detailed data about their consumers as a by-
product of providing their services. For instance, Amazon obtains extraordinary real-time 
insight into the preferences of its more than 200 million customers, who can purchase 
products from millions of third-party sellers on the platform’s marketplace. When a platform 
does not share the collected data or shares very little data with its business users, this can 
give its vertically integrated downstream unit a potentially enormous advantage relative to 
its rival business users. Depending on the factual settings, this can apply to any vertically 
integrated platform that collects information about transactions and consumer behaviour on 
its platform. Amazon is one example that is examined in economic literature. 
Zhu and Liu (2018) empirically study Amazon Retail’s entry in Amazon Marketplace. They find 
that Amazon is more likely to enter the spaces of products with higher sales and better 
reviews, and those not using Amazon’s fulfillment service. They also find that Amazon is less 
likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller effort to grow. Their empirical 
evidence suggests that Amazon’s entry strategy is likely premised on acquiring new 
information after forming partnerships with third-party sellers. They find that Amazon’s entry 




increases product demand and reduces shipping costs, and that affected third-party sellers 
are discouraged from growing their businesses on the platform.54 
In summary, Zhu and Liu (2018) find that Amazon’s practices benefit consumers and harm 
sellers. However, this is a static analysis. What is more important to study is how Amazon’s 
practices affect sellers’ incentives to innovate, especially the incentive for brand owners to 
invest in their branded products to improve their quality. The way Amazon benefits from the 
innovations of sellers is likely to reduce the latter’s incentives to innovate, which can harm 
consumers when this dynamic effect outweighs consumers’ static gain.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The review of the economic literature confirms that platforms have various incentives to bias 
recommendations regardless of whether they are vertically integrated or not. Platforms can 
engage in recommendation bias toward vertically integrated products (leading to pure self-
favouring) or toward high margin products of independent sellers (leading to secondary line 
differentiation). More generally, they can use recommendation bias to enforce their own 
terms of trade with respect to business users, which can lead to hybrid differentiation. 
We have shown the different motives for a vertically integrated firm to engage in vertical 
foreclosure through pure self-favouring. Although the harm from pure self-favouring should 
be compared with its benefit, when platforms are dominant or when consumers single-home 
and have high switching costs, the harm can outweigh the benefit, implying that pure self-
favouring requires special scrutiny under those market conditions. 
It should be further assessed in which cases differentiated treatment (in the three forms 
specified in this report) is to be tolerated or proscribed. Apart from a more in-depth 
assessment of the harmful effects from an economic perspective, a trade-off needs to be 
made about what policy objective is prioritised in the online platform economy. Where a 
certain form of differentiated treatment can have both pro- and anticompetitive effects at 
the same time, a specific prohibition may still be justified in order to stimulate diversity, 
fairness or equality of opportunities for businesses. 
Insights from an analytical paper prepared within the context of our observatory indicate that 
even though most e-commerce platforms provide business users with some data on the 
performance of their competitors, merchants are concerned about the data practices of 
vertically integrated marketplaces who have full access to all data on sales conducted via their 
platforms.55  
                                                          
54 F. Zhu & Q. Liu, ‘Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com’, Strategic Management 
ournal 2018, p. 2618–2642. 
55 Analytical paper 5 of the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, ‘Business user and third-party access 
to online platform data’, July 2020, available at 
https://platformobservatory.eu/app/uploads/2020/09/Analytical-Paper-5-Business-user-and-third-party-
access-to-data_final.pdf.  
See p. 58: ‘The analysis based on accessible evidence did not identify significant differences in the levels of 
business user data access provided by vertically integrated and non-integrated platforms. However, several 
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6 Legal insights 
This part provides an overview of how differentiated treatment is dealt with under various 
legal regimes. The objective is to illustrate that there are various interests at stake protected 
by different legal frameworks. Because of the complexity of the relationships between 
platforms, business users and consumers, it seems impossible to require the platform to act 
in one particular way that can be considered as ‘fair’. In this regard, it is more helpful to regard 
‘fairness’ as a range, rather than a black-and-white concept.  
 
6.1 Insights from competition and economic law  
6.1.1 EU competition law 
Recent competition cases illustrate the application of the three categories of differentiated 
treatment distinguished at the beginning of section 5, namely pure self-favouring, hybrid 
forms of differentiation and pure secondary line differentiation. 
Pure self-favouring was targeted by the European Commission in the 2017 Google Shopping 
competition case. Pure self-favouring concerns differentiated treatment by a vertically 
integrated platform. In addition, self-favouring may occur with respect to partially owned, 
upstream firms.56 The key objective is to exclude rivals from the market. Google was fined for 
abusing its dominant position in the market for online search by giving illegal advantage to its 
own comparison shopping service. In particular, Google was alleged to have systematically 
given prominent placement to Google Shopping, while demoting rival comparison shopping 
services in its search results.57 With regard to the use of data, there is also scope for self-
favouring practices whereby the platform may gain a competitive advantage through the data 
it receives about sales made by rivals. In this regard, the European Commission has sent a 
statement of objections to Amazon in November 2020 for the use of non-public business data 
of independent sellers who sell on its marketplace to the benefit of its own retail business.58 
                                                          
merchants indicated that the data practices of the vertically-integrated marketplaces are concerning, as they 
have all the competitor data, while the sellers get almost none’. 
See p. 61: ‘even though the evidence from case studies is not sufficient to claim that vertically-integrated 
platforms systematically tend to provide less data to its business users, they also may have incentives to take 
the success of their verticals into the equation’ and ‘the interview programme and analysis of other evidence 
showed that the key competition-related stemming from data advantage concerns vertically integrated 
platforms. Business users in e-commerce, as well as OTAs (as business users of Google) expressed concerns 
that vertically integrated platforms combine data collected on them, their consumers and business users to 
develop competing products’. 
 
56 In February 2019, new regulation entered into force in India that precludes e-commerce companies running 




57 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), 27 June 2017. 
58 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for 
the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business 
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Another typical example of a vertically integrated business is Apple App Store, which markets 
a number of its own popular apps like Apple Music, and at the same time maintains the same 
marketplace for competitors like Spotify. A vertically integrated platform might face 
accusations of self-favouring through applying more favourable policies for its own products, 
and selective drafting and application of rules favouring own products.  
For instance, Apple is currently facing a number of complaints and controversies as reported 
by news outlets. Most notably Spotify filed a complaint arguing that it cannot be set as a 
default app, has difficulties sharing discounts with customers, and faces unfair pricing 
conditions.59 Apple’s own apps allegedly do not face the same restrictions. Similarly, Apple 
was reported in the media to coincidentally ban or restrict some of the most downloaded 
screen-time and parental-control apps exactly around the same time as Apple debuted its 
own app.60 According to Apple’s account, it only tried to limit privacy exposure of its users 
due to some technologies used.61 However, it seems that no action was taken against these 
apps before Apple’s own app in the segment was launched.62 As regards the legal test for 
assessing self-favouring under Article 102 TFEU, the Commission in Google Shopping referred 
to ‘the use of a dominant position on one market to extend that dominant position to one or 
more adjacent markets’ (commonly qualified as ‘leveraging’) which, according to the 
Commission, ‘constitutes a well-established, independent, form of abuse falling outside the 
scope of competition on the merits’.63 The more favourable positioning of Google’s own 
comparison shopping service in its general search results was qualified as abusive, because it 
diverted traffic away from rivals and was capable of having, or likely to have, anticompetitive 
effects in the relevant markets for general search and comparison shopping. 
The hybrid category differs from pure self-favouring in that hybrid forms of differentiated 
treatment do not relate to the favouring of a platform’s affiliated services versus non-
affiliated services. Instead, the differentiation takes place among non-affiliated businesses 
but indirectly benefits the platform in a different market than the one in which the non-
affiliated customers compete. The investigation of the Italian Competition Authority against 
Amazon is a good example. According to the Italian competition authority, Amazon grants 
improved visibility, higher search rankings and better access to consumers only to merchants 
who also use its logistics services.64 Some of these merchants can compete with the platform 
in their respective retail market. However, the platform’s benefit from engaging in this type 
                                                          
practices’, 10 November 2020, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077. For a recent empirical study of 
Amazon’s practices, see F. Zhu & Q. Liu, ‘Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com’, 
Strategic Management Journal 2018, p. 2618–2642. 
59 See https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/13/18263453/spotify-apple-app-store-antitrust-complaint-ec-30-
percent-cut-unfair 
60 See https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/technology/apple-screen-time-trackers.html?module=inline 
61 See https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/technology/apple-screen-time-trackers.html?module=inline 
62 See https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/technology/apple-screen-time-trackers.html?module=inline 
63 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), 27 June 2017, par. 649. 
64 Press release Italian Competition Authority, ‘A528 - Amazon: investigation launched on possible abuse of a 





of differentiation mainly lies in a different market, namely in the market for logistics services. 
The platform’s behaviour provides merchants with incentives to rely on the platform’s 
logistics services, which may reduce competition in this market to the detriment of rival 
providers of logistics services. The key question is whether this type of differentiation is 
legitimate. The platform may for instance claim that it benefits consumers, because the fact 
that merchants also take its logistics services means the platform can better assure 
consumers a good quality deal and faster delivery. This type of behaviour is not an ‘outright’ 
form of self-favouring, since the platform does not simply give its own offerings more 
prominent placement in the ranking vis-à-vis those of non-affiliated business. However, it is 
clear that the downgrading in a ranking of business users who do not take additional services 
versus those who do, can benefit the platform by foreclosing competition in a related market. 
The behaviour contains exploitative elements because some businesses are favoured over 
others. However, an exclusionary motive prevails because the ultimate aim of the platform is 
to strengthen its own position to the detriment of rivals in the related market. These concerns 
also seem to be part of the second competition investigation the European Commission 
opened into Amazon in November 2020 exploring whether the criteria that Amazon sets to 
select the winner of the “Buy Box” and to enable sellers to offer products to Prime users lead 
to preferential treatment of the sellers that use Amazon’s logistics and delivery services.65 
Pure secondary line differentiation qualifies as purely exploitative behaviour. Whereas 
primary line injury concerns exclusionary behaviour by which a supplier forecloses 
competitors from the market in which it operates itself, secondary line injury is exercised by 
a supplier against some of its customers compared to one or more of its other customers. This 
way, the supplier can distort competition on the downstream market, where it is not active, 
by favouring and exploiting some customers over others.66 The Court of Justice clarified in the 
MEO judgment in November 2018 to what extent a dominant firm can be held liable for 
discriminatory conduct towards downstream customers under EU competition law. In 
particular, the Court stated that ‘the mere presence of an immediate disadvantage affecting 
operators who were charged more, compared with the tariffs applied to their competitors for 
an equivalent service, does not, however, mean that competition is distorted or is capable of 
being distorted’.67 While focusing on the relationship between the dominant undertaking and 
those trade partners which this undertaking allegedly discriminated against, the Court held 
that the finding of ‘a ‘competitive disadvantage’ does not require proof of actual quantifiable 
deterioration in the competitive situation, but must be based on an analysis of all the relevant 
circumstances of the case leading to the conclusion that that behaviour has an effect on the 
costs, profits or any other relevant interest of one or more of those partners, so that that 
conduct is such as to affect that situation’. Advocate General Wahl discussed the incentives 
                                                          
65 Note that this investigation also explores potential preferential treatment of Amazon’s own retail business. 
Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the 
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of an undertaking to discriminate between downstream competitors in his Opinion in MEO. 
According to the Advocate General, it is difficult to see how an undertaking benefits from 
differentiated treatment on a downstream market in which it is not active itself. In his words: 
‘it would appear highly problematic to penalise an undertaking for an abuse of its supposed 
dominant position on the ground that it has applied differentiated prices to its trading 
partners on the downstream market when it is not even active on that market and benefits 
directly from the competition that exists between those trading partners’.68  
Whereas EU competition law is generally capable to target the exclusionary forms of 
differentiated treatment, namely pure self-favouring and hybrid differentiation, the scope for 
competition enforcement relating to pure secondary line differentiation seems more difficult 
following the MEO case. This means that other regimes, in particular those of national 
economic law, become more important as tools to address possible harmful effects of 
exploitative forms of differentiated treatment. The next section discusses the role of these 
regimes of national economic law in this regard. 
 
6.1.2 National economic law 
Beyond the applicability of EU competition law, a number of Member States (e.g. Germany, 
France, Greece, and recently also Belgium) have national legislation in place to protect against 
abuses of economic dependence. Economic dependence is a different concept than 
dominance in EU competition law, so that businesses who are dependent on a platform to 
operate may rely on such national regimes if practices of differentiated treatment are not 
caught by the competition rules. While some of these regimes also require commercial 
conduct to distort competition for triggering protection, their objective complements 
competition law that mainly protects the welfare of consumers and not the ability of 
businesses to compete. For instance, in its press release announcing the investigation against 
Amazon’s terms and conditions, the German Bundeskartellamt referred not only to the 
possibility that Amazon holds a dominant position but also that ‘the sellers are dependent on 
Amazon’.69 National rules on abuse of economic dependence may particularly complement 
competition law by targeting exploitative behaviour. The scope of competition enforcement 
for exploitation is more limited than that for exclusionary behaviour as discussed in the 
previous section. Despite their potential to provide protection to business users of online 
platforms, one may wonder whether possibly divergent regimes at national level (i) can 
effectively resolve platform-related issues that are often of a cross-border nature and/or (ii) 
even constitute a fragmentation of the internal market.  
Another relevant regime is unfair competition law, which again is regulated at the national 
level with some EU harmonisation for B2B practices with impact on consumers. The 
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relationship between competition law (stemming from the EU framework) and national unfair 
competition law for cases of differentiated treatment can be illustrated by reference to 
situations where platforms engage in a restriction, suspension or termination of service 
towards business users. Such blocking can take place due to delegated enforcement of 
governmental policies (e.g. data protection rules,70 rules on illegal content, governmental 
bans71), or enforcement of a platform’s own rules/preferences. Here we focus on the latter, 
although in practice, the two might not always be easy to separate.72 Platforms try to enforce 
their terms of service independently, if necessary. Because of the ‘platform nature’ of their 
operations, a very effective way to do so is simply to suspend, restrict or terminate services 
that consumers access through the platform. Platforms thus consciously use their 
gatekeeping function in order to enforce contractual discipline of their business partners. For 
instance, app stores like Apple App Store or Google Play Store are able to remove apps; on-
demand cloud computing platforms like Amazon Web Services are able to suspend accounts 
of their clients; mobile operating systems like Android are able to restrict particular 
functionalities. In these situations, there are two main constellations depending on whether 
the platform is engaging in self-favouring or not. While for cases of pure self-favouring the 
often-invoked legal instruments originate in EU competition law (as discussed in the previous 
section), the accusation often takes the form of unfair competition claims in cases where 
platforms are not vertically integrated. 
In these situations where platform operators enforce policies regulating access to the 
platform, the objections have an exploitative rather than a purely exclusionary nature. The 
platforms are accused either to enforce their policies inconsistently among market 
participants, thus indirectly favouring some, or to formulate policies in ways, which 
discriminate certain classes of services. A good example of such platforms are operating 
systems, browsers, ad-blocking or anti-virus software. Especially the last two groups of 
platforms are increasingly under scrutiny in Germany for alleged violation of fair commercial 
practices. A number of German courts were asked to assess whether ad-blocking services can 
be seen as unfairly competing if they block advertising as a source of revenue and sometimes 
even ask for fees for white-listing of particular websites. The German Federal Supreme Court 
held in April 201873 that such a practice does not constitute a deliberate hindrance of 
competitors or aggressive commercial practice, both torts of unfair competition. The main 
argument for allowing the offering of the blocking software in its commercial form (i.e. by 
whitelisting certain ads against payment) was that this would allow for a fair outcome and 
balancing of interests between end-users, publishers and software producers. Similar 
                                                          
70 See https://9to5mac.com/2019/05/06/apple-removes-three-dating-apps-from-app-store/  
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outcomes were encountered in cases against anti-virus services blocking third-party 
services.74 Nevertheless, the balancing of interests is to be carried out on a case-by-case basis. 
Those cases are evidence of the long and complex chain of dependencies: data subscription 
rates / app store policies / ad-blocking software / publishers’ revenue. 
Although these regimes in national economic law may complement EU competition law by 
providing stronger protection against exploitation, they thus also have their limits considering 
the outcomes of the cases discussed above.  
 
6.2 Insights from regimes protecting rights of individuals  
Legal regimes protecting the rights of individuals form a further disciplining force on the 
ability of platforms to act solely in their own interests. This includes requirements from 
consumer law, including the law related to unfair business practices targeted at the 
relationship between businesses and consumers (unlike the business-to-business protection 
for unfair commercial practices considered in the previous section), consumer contract law 
protecting reasonable expectations with respect to platform functioning, non-discrimination 
law (direct discrimination/indirect discrimination), and data protection law in particular with 
regard to the collection and use of personal data by platforms, the passing on of such data to 
business users and third parties, and automated decision making/profiling. 
Consumer law is relevant for the relationship between platforms and end-users, as well as for 
business users and end-users. Consumers may be confronted with platform and business 
practices that lack transparency or are misleading. For instance, end-users may be misled or 
not properly informed about the collection and use of their data. Platform ranking practices 
may be misleading or unfair, for instance in the way that rankings may suggest an objective 
evaluation of the relevance of particular supply side offerings without disclosure of payment 
for more favourable treatment. 
Considering the data-intensive nature of platform governance and platforms’ business 
models, data protection is a crucial legal framework that applies to this context. European 
data protection law applies to the processing of personal data, assigning a set of 
responsibilities to the controller(s) that is (or are jointly) responsible for complying with the 
law.75 European data protection law is concerned with and underpinned by the protection of 
fundamental rights, the right to private life (Article 7 Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the 
right to protection of personal data (Article 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights) in particular. 
For platforms in their relation to business users and end-users, the General Data Protection 
Regulation is the relevant framework. In addition, for some platforms, the ePrivacy Directive 
(currently under revision) has relevant additional rules.  
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75 Recent case law (Wirtschaftsakademie) of the Court of Justice shows that business users can, under 
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As personal data ends up playing a crucial role in the offering of platforms to supply-side 
users, data protection law has a significant impact on this relationship, too. As shown by a 
decision of the German Competition authority (BKartA) against Facebook,76 data protection 
law may also be of relevance to determine the existence of abuse of dominance under 
competition law and thereby shape platforms’ relationships not only with consumers but also 
with supply side-users - depending on the extent to which such an approach to integrate data 
protection concepts into competition law is accepted.77 European data protection requires 
that controllers process personal data of individuals lawfully, fairly and transparently. The 
definition of personal data is broad and will easily apply to much of the data that is captured 
on individual end-users and end-user interactions with the platform. Even if platforms would 
be willing to share as much data as business users would be willing to receive or pay for, data 
protection law requires such sharing to be properly negotiated with end-users. The 
Cambridge Analytica scandal has shown the extent to which the sharing of personal data by 
platforms with business users can breach the trust and expectations of end-users, in addition 
to breaching the relevant laws.  
Ideally, compliance with data protection law by platforms does not affect the level playing 
field between business users, but there are a number of instances where platforms have been 
accused of enforcing data privacy anti-competitively. This is a complex problem that also 
intersects with the pressure on platforms to police business users on relevant data practices. 
In the context of mobile applications, for instance, regulators have recommended that app 
stores set and enforce restrictions related to data privacy on apps.  
Another legal framework that can be of relevance here, is non-discrimination law (in the 
broader sense, i.e. concerning not only businesses but also individuals). In discussions of 
algorithmic governance and data-driven decision making, the possibility that problematic 
and/or even unlawful discriminatory practices may take place, has been a prominent concern. 
One concern is that platform users may discriminate other users when using the platform. 
Whereas traditional suppliers of services in areas that come with particularly strong risks of 
discrimination, such as housing, hotels, transport and labour, have to comply with non-
discrimination law, platforms can create new ways in which such discriminatory practices by 
users may remain undetected.  The possibility that business users may indeed try to 
discriminate in the way that they use platforms, can be a reason for platforms to police 
business users in this regard. In response to concerns about discrimination of drivers and 
passengers, Uber, for instance, recently launched new features to its service to report 
discrimination.78 Another possible concern is that platforms may themselves discriminate 
                                                          
76 See the English translation of  the decision of the BKartA of 15 February 2019 at 
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78 See Uber, Together We Celebrate Pride, 2019, available at https://www.uber.com/en-NL/blog/together-we-
celebrate-pride/       
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between different business users and/or end-users.79 Such discrimination can happen 
deliberately, but more often than that, it may be the result of biased data-sets and inputs that 
are used in decision-making processes that try to optimise the platform’s performance.  For 
instance, relying on reviews and ratings that are partly shaped by discriminatory preferences 
and practices of users may lead to biased training data in machine learning models that 
platforms use for the optimisation of their matchmaking function.80 The question of how to 
detect, audit and address such discriminatory bias is an active area of research as well as 
practice. 
In sum, the platform finds itself in a position of power not only vis-à-vis business users but 
also versus consumers. And enforcement of relevant laws to protect end-users interests and 
fundamental rights increasingly relies on the platforms’ cooperation and sometimes even 
proactive efforts to police supply side-users for illegal and harmful practices. This increases 
the legal complexity of the relationship between platforms and business users. It can also 
provide a justifiable defense for platforms to act restrictively towards business users that do 
not, in the eyes of the platform and relevant regulators, comply with relevant protections of 
end-users. The extent to which this is legitimate considering the potential far-reaching impact 
of such practices on business users depends on how to strike a balance between the various 
interests at stake. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The analysis illustrates that it is difficult – if not impossible – to reconcile the interests of 
platforms, businesses and consumers in one particular way that is to be regarded as ‘fair’. For 
this reason, ‘fairness’ should not be seen as a black-and-white concept, but instead as a range. 
For assessing what practices fall outside this range of ‘fairness’, in other words which practices 
can be considered as ‘unfair’, in a first step more transparency and oversight is needed into 
the practices in which platforms engage. The Platform-to-Business Regulation provides a good 
starting point in this regard by, amongst others: imposing a notice period of at least 15 days 
before platforms (referred to as ‘providers of online intermediation services’ in the 
Regulation) can implement changes to its terms and conditions;81 requiring platforms to 
provide a business user with a statement of reasons when restricting, suspending and 
terminating its service;82 requiring platforms to set out in their terms and conditions the main 
parameters determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance of those main 
                                                          
79 A trivial example that may illustrate the possible issue is that Google used to refuse beer advertising for 
beer, while accepting sponsored links for Wine, in Google Adwords. 
80 For a discussion, see e.g. Rosenblat, Alex, Karen EC Levy, Solon Barocas, and Tim Hwang. "Discriminating 
Tastes: Uber's Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Workplace Discrimination." Policy & Internet 9, no. 3 (2017): 
256-279. 
81 Article 3(2) of the Platform-to-Business Regulation. 
82 Article 4(1) of the Platform-to-Business Regulation. 
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parameters as opposed to others,83 a description of any differentiated treatment platforms 
give84 and a description of the access of business users to data.85  
Beyond increasing transparency, specific practices of problematic differentiated treatment 
may be qualified as unfair depending on the policy objective pursued in future regulation. 
More generally, as unfair should be regarded practices of differentiated treatment that 
significantly harm business users and for which the platform does not have a legitimate 
reason. The extent to which legitimate reasons invoked by a platform can justify harm to 
businesses is a key issue of attention here. More proactive guidance to this effect is welcome 
to prevent that platforms act as enforcers of public interests to the detriment of businesses, 
consumers and society overall. To further strengthen protection and increase ‘procedural 
fairness’, one can think of mechanisms to reverse the burden of proof and assist businesses 
who do not have access to information about why they have been subject to differentiated 
treatment by a platform.86  
Ultimately, a policy choice has to be made regarding the regulatory objectives to be pursued 
when adopting further measures to protect substantive fairness. Because of the far-reaching 
consequences a restriction, suspension or termination of service can have on business users, 
we recommend to prioritise this issue to ensure that future prohibitions of certain forms of 
differentiated treatment are coupled with effective enforcement and availability of redress 
for businesses against such practices. 
 
7 Way forward  
Bringing together the technical, economic and legal insights, a number of areas can be 
identified that require further scrutiny due to the especially far-reaching impact 
differentiated treatment can have here.  
While differentiated treatment already poses challenges in principle, the size and technical 
makeup of online platforms make it difficult to establish problematic differentiated treatment 
in practice. Techniques like machine learning create opacity when it comes to nailing down 
causal relationships between data signals and outcomes, while personalisation and 
localisation further reduce the “observability” of how platforms differentiate between 
products and participants. Regulators hoping to acquire the capabilities to monitor the 
behaviour of platforms in greater detail will have to innovate and experiment with methods 
such as technical audits or web-scraping to deal with this situation.  
The economic analysis shows that platforms have various incentives to bias recommendations 
regardless of whether they are vertically integrated or not. Moreover, vertically integrated 
                                                          
83 Article 5(1) of the Platform-to-Business Regulation. 
84 Article 7(1) of the Platform-to-Business Regulation. 
85 Article 9(1) of the Platform-to-Business Regulation. 
86 In the context of self-favouring, see J. Crémer, Y.-A. De Montjoye & H. Schweitzer, Competition policy for the 
digital era, 2019, p. 66-67. 
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platforms can have incentives to engage in vertical foreclosure through differentiated 
treatments. In particular, when platforms are dominant or when consumers single-home and 
have high switching costs, practices of differentiated treatment by vertically integrated 
platforms require special scrutiny as the relevant harms can outweigh the benefits. It is also 
important to understand better how vertical integration affects the data access policy of a 
platform and how that policy in turn affects static and dynamic welfare. Businesses have 
expressed particular concerns about the use of data on their sales by vertically integrated 
platforms to serve the latter’s own commercial interests. 
Differentiated treatment cannot be looked at in isolation or from a mere economic 
perspective. Considering the increasingly significant societal function and impact of 
platforms, platforms have increasingly taken on broader regulatory functions and manage 
complex trade-offs between different interests involved in their governance in ways that are 
not clearly stipulated by existing law. Media pluralism, data privacy, consumer protection, 
and non-discrimination are amongst the areas implicated in the functioning of platforms. This 
is an additional reason for increased transparency and the development of more effective 
oversight frameworks related to platforms, from the perspective of fairness to relevant 
constituencies, including, but not limited to business users. While differentiation is inherent 
in the economy (both offline and online), there is a need to keep a close eye on how platforms 
design their rankings, enforce their terms and conditions and treat business users. This is 
especially the case where competition is not strong enough to discipline the ability of 
platforms to act solely in their own interests.  
Moving forward, policy choices have to be made about which objectives should be prioritised 
in the online platform economy. There are real trade-offs to be made, as the different 
interests, those of the platform, business users, and consumers, cannot be fully aligned and 
reconciled. It is a valid choice to promote the contestability of markets and ban certain forms 
of differentiated treatment (subject to the ability of platforms to defend their practices on 
the basis of public interest objectives) in order to stimulate diversity, fairness or equality of 
opportunities for businesses. However, this may imply that we accept risks of banning 
practices that possibly have partly procompetitive effects in the longer run. The difficulty of 
designing specific prohibitions is that practices of differentiated treatment may have pro- and 
anticompetitive effects at the same time.  
Normative priorities may nevertheless need be set to let certain policy objectives prevail. The 
high levels of market concentration and dependency of business users in some parts of the 
online platform economy should be taken into account when making such trade-offs. From a 
policy perspective, there are various possibilities in between keeping to existing competition 
enforcement for dominant platforms and the imposition of a non-discrimination obligation 
applicable to any platform regardless of its size. Different measures with a varying level of 
intervention can be designed with a different impact on the various actors involved.  
To ensure effective implementation, future prohibitions of certain problematic practices of 
differentiated treatment should be coupled with proper monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. Based on the findings in this report, we would recommend to prioritise two 
areas of particular concern: 1) the observability of differentiated treatment by platforms 
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arising from techniques such as personalisation and localisation; (2) the availability of 
effective redress for businesses against the restriction, suspension or termination of service 
by platforms. 
 
